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Abstract: 
This paper presents statistical analysis supporting stylized facts about sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs). It discusses the forces leading to the growth of SWFs, including the role of fuel 
exports and ongoing current account surpluses, and large hoarding of international reserves.  It 
analyzes the degree to which measures of SWF governance and transparency compare with 
national norms of behavior. We provide evidence that many countries with SWFs are 
characterized by effective governance, but weak democratic institutions, as compared to other 
nonindustrial countries. We also present a model with which we compare the optimal degree of 
diversification abroad by a central bank versus that of a sovereign wealth fund.  We show that 
if the central bank manages its foreign assets with the objective of reducing the probability of 
sudden stops, it will place a high weight on the downside risk of holding risky assets abroad 
and will tend to hold primarily safe foreign assets. In contrast, if the sovereign wealth fund, 
acting on behalf of the Treasury, maximizes the expected utility of a representative domestic 
agent, it will opt for relatively greater holding of more risky foreign assets. We discuss how the 
degree of a country’s transparency may affect the size of the foreign asset base entrusted to a 
wealth fund’s management, and show that, for relatively low levels of public foreign assets, 
assigning portfolio management independence to the central bank may be advantageous. 
However, for a large enough foreign asset base, the opportunity cost associated with the 
limited portfolio diversification of the central bank induces authorities to establish a wealth 
fund in pursuit of higher returns.   
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1. Introduction 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are saving funds controlled by sovereign governments 
that hold and manage foreign assets.  Private analysts put current sovereign wealth fund assets in 
the range of $2 to 3 trillion or even higher.
1 This amount is projected to grow to as much as $13 
trillion in the next ten years, an amount larger than the current global stock of foreign reserves of 
about $6 trillion.
2  While not a new phenomenon, the recent activities and projected growth of 
SWFs have stirred debate about the extent to which their size may allow them to affect financial 
markets and their policies may be driven by non-economic considerations. 
As an increasing share of the foreign asset holdings of SWFs shift from government debt 
obligations to private equities, concerns also have arisen about how institutions in the “investing” 
and “receiving” countries may need to adapt. Much discussion has been devoted to the need for 
individual SWFs to be more transparent about their investment approach, by providing more 
information on the type and amounts of assets they hold, and about their governance structure, 
by clarifying how decisions are made and monitored. 
This paper gives an overview of the ongoing debate about the expanding role of SWFs in 
international financial markets. It discusses the forces leading to the growth of SWFs and 
provides statistical analysis supporting stylized facts about their determinants. It also analyzes 
the degree to which measures of the governance and transparency of individual SWFs compare 
                                                 
1 Ziemba (2008) estimates SWF assets amounted to around $2 trillion at the end of 2007.  Lyons (2007) and Jen 
(2007) give figures of roughly $2.2 and $2.5 trillion, respecitvely. Truman (2008) estimates that SWFs managed just 
under $3 trillion at the end of 2007 (he also identifies another $2.3 billion under management by sovereign pension 
funds).  Definitional issues tend to account for most of the divergence in estimates. For example, Truman includes 
investment funds managed by monetary authorities in Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, and Russia. Ziemba excludes these 
funds as well as SWFs who primarily hold domestic assets (e.g., Singapore’s Temasek and Malaysia’s Khazanah 
Fund). Based on public ownership asset data, Balding (2008) suggests that sovereign wealth funds manage much 
less than any of  the numbers above; however, he ignores assets handled by external fund managers. 
2 Jen (2007) projects global SWF assets will total $12 trillion in 2015; the IMF Survey (March 4, 2008) projects an 
increase to $8-13 trillion by 2013.  Lyons (2007) projects a total of $13 trillion by 2017.    2
with national and global norms of behavior. In addition, the paper discusses how expansion of 
asset holdings of SWFs may affect the level of official reserve holdings. The paper concludes 
with discussion of the implications of growing SWFs for international financial markets.  
 
2. Reasons for the Growth of SWFs  
 
SWFs have become an important class of investors in terms of the size of assets under 
sovereign control.  How do they compare to other pools of global investment? As shown in 
Figure 1, SWF asset holdings now amount to much less than the funds under management by 
mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, $20-30 trillion each, and less than the $6 
trillion in central bank foreign reserve holdings (including $1.8 trillion by China). But they are 
more than the $1.9 trillion under management by hedge funds and almost $1 trillion by private 
equity groups. 
SWFS generally fall into two categories according to the source of their foreign exchange 
assets. Commodity SWFs are funded by commodity exports, either owned or taxed by 
government (e.g. the Gulf States, Norway, Russia). They have been established for various 
purposes, including stabilization of fiscal revenues, management of inter-generational savings, 
and sterilization of the effects of balance of payments inflows on domestic inflation. Non-
commodity SWFs are funded typically by the transfer of assets from official foreign exchange 
reserves (e.g. China, other Asia countries).  Current estimates suggest that funds derived from oil 
and gas export revenues account for some two thirds of the total assets held by SWFs, with the 
rest consisting of funds mainly controlled by Asian surplus exporters.  
The growth of SWFs may be viewed as a consequence of countries running persistent 
current account surpluses and accumulating net foreign assets. SWFs arise as a by-product of   3
these current account surpluses in circumstances where sovereign governments choose to retain 
control of the foreign assets acquired. 
There are several reasons for the accumulation of net foreign assets by sovereigns and the 
resulting growth of sovereign wealth funds. First, the recent commodity price boom has swelled 
the sovereign asset holdings of commodity-exporting countries where the public sector controls 
commodity exports or heavily taxes the revenues earned by private commodity exporters. Earlier 
commodity price booms vividly illustrate the adverse effect on competitiveness of domestic 
inflation and large real appreciations induced by using these windfall gains for domestic 
expenditures, particularly when the gains are transitory. For example, the windfall gains 
associated with the sharp rise in the price of oil in 1973–1974 induced oil-exporting countries to 
increase government spending; this spending fell sharply when oil prices collapsed in the early 
1980s. Consequently, some sovereigns have sought to deal with these concerns by saving a share 
of the gains in SWFs. In some cases these savings are used as a financial stabilizer if commodity 
prices fall and depress tax revenue declines. In other cases, SWFs serve as mechanisms to 
transform concentrated exposure of public assets to volatile commodity prices into a more 
balanced and diversified global exposure, thereby protecting the income of future generations. 
A second factor behind the growth of SWFs is the effort by many emerging market 
countries to accumulate large stockpiles of international reserves by running persistent current 
account surpluses (see Aizenman 2007). Many of these countries, particularly in Asia, now hold 
more reserves than needed for prudential reasons. Attempts to diversify these reserves into 
potentially higher-yielding assets entail transferring them from the control of the central bank to 
the Treasury or to quasi-public entities, such as SWFs, with the mandate to pursue financial 
strategies aiming at higher long-run returns.  For example, China recently set up the China   4
Investment Corporation with assets worth $200 billion to manage more aggressively a portion of 
its over $1.8 trillion in foreign reserves (as of June 2008). 
Of course, by definition, the global sum of all current accounts adds up to zero. Hence, 
the growing current account surpluses of commodity exporters and Asian countries are the 
mirror image of the growing current account deficits of other countries, primarily the U.S. in 
recent years.  In this view the excess saving and accumulation of foreign assets by surplus 
countries is the counterpart to the excess demand and issuance of foreign liabilities by deficit 
countries. The resulting international wealth transfer from debtors in one country to creditors in 
others fosters the growth of SWFs when sovereign governments choose to retain control of the 
foreign assets accumulated.  
SWFs are fundamentally different from monetary authorities holding official foreign 
reserves, where liquidity and security issues necessitate a short investment horizon and low risk 
tolerance.  Central banks generally invest their foreign exchange reserves conservatively in safe 
and marketable instruments that are readily available to monetary authorities to meet balance of 
payments needs. In contrast, SWFs typically seek to diversify foreign exchange assets and earn a 
higher return by investing in a broader range of asset classes, including longer-term government 
bonds, agency and asset-backed securities, corporate bonds, equities, commodities, real estate, 
derivatives, and foreign direct investment.  
SWFs typically make little use of leverage, in contrast to hedge funds and private equity 
funds which generally engage in highly leveraged transactions.  SWFs also differ from large 
institutional private investors such as mutual and insurance funds, in that although they hold 
assets, they generally have no specific liabilities to be paid to shareholders or policyholders. 
SWFs similarly differ from sovereign pension funds (SPFs) in that the latter, while government-  5
owned, have explicit liabilities, such as worker pensions. For this reason, SWFs typically have 
had less incentive to be transparent about their investment and management practices.  However, 
as SWFs invest more of their assets in private financial markets, greater concern has arisen as to 
the extent to which they should follow the practices of private institutional investors. 
In the appendix we present a model with which we compare the optimal degree of 
diversification abroad by a central bank versus that of a sovereign wealth fund, depending on the 
authorities’ utility function.  We show that if the central bank manages its foreign assets with the 
objective of reducing the probability of sudden stops, it will place a high weight on the downside 
risk of holding risky assets abroad and will tend to hold primarily safe foreign assets. In contrast, 
if a sovereign wealth fund, acting on behalf of the Treasury,, maximizes the expected utility of a 
representative domestic agent, it will opt for greater diversification towards holding more risky 
foreign assets.
 3  
Our model suggests that, for relatively low levels of public foreign assets, assigning 
portfolio management independence to the central bank may advantageous. However, for a large 
enough foreign asset base accumulated through commodity exports or foreign exchange 
intervention, the opportunity cost associated with the limited portfolio diversification of the 
central bank becomes high enough to induce the authorities to establish a wealth fund in pursuit 
of greater returns.  In these circumstances, the fund would opt for much greater investment in 
foreign equities, while the central bank manages its assets with limited diversification, so as to 
minimize the downside risk of sudden stop crises.   
                                                 
3 We also formulate a more elaborate model of joint decision making in which we treat the Treasury as the dominant 
player and assume that it sets the total level of foreign assets managed by the central bank, but delegates to the 
central bank the responsibility for maintaining financial stability through the composition of its portfolio. 
Conditional on the actions of the central bank, the Treasury decides what level of public foreign assets to entrust to 
the central bank for management as well as the composition of the residual share of the country’s public foreign 
assets managed through the SWF. In these circumstances, we find that the assignment of the objective to financial 
stability to the central bank tends to increase the gap between the optimal diversification patterns of the bank and the 
fund.   6
 
3. Data Analysis and Stylized Facts about SWFs 
In this section we provide graphical and statistical support for stylized facts about SWFs. 
Table 1 summarizes data on SWFs by country, taken from Truman (2008), including the country 
fund name, date of establishment, and estimated size.
4 (When there is a range of size figures we 
take the average; when there is more than one fund per country, we take the sum and use the 
establishment date of the largest fund.)  We exclude sovereign pension funds (SPFs), e.g., the 
Australia Future Fund and Canada Pension Fund, since typically they have limited foreign 
investment assets
5 and, as noted earlier, they differ significantly in their governance structure 
because of the nature of the liabilities on their balance sheets. 
6 We also exclude non-Federal 
sovereign wealth funds, e.g. the Alaska Permanent Fund and the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust, 
since we wish to focus on cross-country differences in SWF behavior at the national level.  
Figure 2 depicts the SWFs in our sample by decreasing total asset size.  Observe that 
SWF asset holdings are fairly concentrated, with the top six funds, accounting for three-fourths 
of total SWF assets. The United Arab Emirates, including the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, 
established back in 1976, and other assorted funds, have a combined asset value of over $800 
billion. Norway’s Government Pension Fund - Global (previously called the Petroleum Fund of 
Norway) was established in 1990 and now holds over $350 billion. In Asia, Singapore’s two 
government investment funds—the Government Investment Corporation (GIC) and Temasek—
have combined assets of over $300 billion.  Saudi Arabia’s oil surplus funds, mainly managed by 
the central bank together with its reserves, amount to almost $300 billion. Kuwait and China 
                                                 
4 We used 2003 as the establishment date of the Qatar Investment Authority, rather than Truman’s 2005 date, based 
on information from the fund’s website.  
5 Some SWFs do not hold foreign assets exclusively. For example, Singapore’s Temask and Malaysia’s Khazanah 
Fund hold substantial domestic assets, as indicated in Figure 2.  
6We will compare the governance behavior of SWFs and SPFs below.   7
hold roughly $200 billion each in SWFs.  As shown in Table 1, almost all of these large funds 
have been in existence for fairly long periods, having been established in 1990 or earlier (China 
is the exception). 
 
3.A. Determinants of SWFs 
We begin with simple depictions of the characteristics of countries with SWFs relative to 
other countries. All data are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2008; 
we use the data for 2006, the latest reported in the WDI, or the most recent available. Small 
countries with populations in 2006 of less than 250,000 are excluded. 
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of countries according to their specialization in fuel 
exports, defined as fuel exports as a share of total merchandise exports. Countries with SWFs in 
2007 or 2008 are indicated by dark (blue) bars. Not surprisingly, the figure  shows that SWFs 
tend to be prevalent among intensive fuel-exporting countries. As fuel prices have risen over 
time in recent years, countries that are heavy fuel exporters have earned sizable amounts of 
revenue from exports and accumulated foreign assets.
7 They also have had more reason than 
other countries to diversify their foreign asset holdings through SWFs. 
Figure 4 depicts the distribution of SWFs across countries ranked by average current 
account surpluses as a share of GDP over the period 2002-2006. (In cases where current account 
data is missing, we use the most recent years or use trade balance data instead.) Observe that 
countries with SWFs tend to be countries with high current account surpluses.  Although many 
SWF countries with large current account surpluses also are intensive fuel exporters (the raw 
correlation is 0.48, the rank correlation is .37), many are not.  Comparison of Figures 2 and 3 
                                                 
7 This presumes that imports expand by less than exports.   8
indicates that economies, such as Hong Kong, China, and Chile, among others, rank low in terms 
of fuel exports, but relatively high in terms of current account surpluses.  
Figure 5 depicts the distribution of SWFs across countries ranked by GDP per capita (in 
$2000).  Observe that countries with SWFs tend to be fairly evenly distributed across income 
levels.  That is, there are high, medium, and low income countries with SWFs. 
What are the foreign reserve holdings of countries with a SWF?  Figure 6 shows the 
distribution of countries ordered by their level of foreign reserves (excluding gold) as a share of 
GDP. Not surprisingly, the ratio of reserves to GDP is relatively high in many countries with 
SWFs, particularly in countries that have recently established such funds.   However, reserves 
are somewhat lower in some countries, particularly those in the Gulf area (e.g. Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates) with SWFs of longer duration.  
We now turn to more formal statistical analysis of the determinants of sovereign wealth 
funds. We first analyze the effect of individual country characteristics on the existence of a 
sovereign wealth fund in 2007 or 2008.  Table 2 reports the results of probit regressions of the 
incidence of SWFs, defined as a 0-1 dummy, as a function of the (five-year average) current 
account/GDP ratio, fuel exports as a share of total exports, and ore and metal exports as a share 
of total exports. As reported in column (1), the coefficients on the first two variables are positive 
and significant. Countries that run larger current account surpluses or that specialize in fuel 
exports are more likely to have established sovereign wealth funds. This confirms the insights 
drawn from Figures 3 and 4.  
In terms of economic significance, an increase in a country’s current account surplus as a 
percent of GDP by 10% percentage points  (as occurred in China between 2001 and 2007
8) raises 
                                                 
8 China’s current account balance as a ratio to GDP rose from 1.3% in 2001 to 11.1% in 2007 (IMF World Economic 
Outlook, April 2008, Statistical Appendix, Table A12.)   9
the likelihood of a SWF by 8 percentage points (0.767x100). A 10 percentage point increase in 
fuel exports as a share of total merchandise exports by 10% raises the probability by 3 
percentage points. In contrast, the coefficient on ore and metals exports, though positive, is not 
significant.
9 
Other possible determinants are considered in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.  The 
coefficient on GDP per capita is positive, but insignificant.
10 The association of foreign reserves 
and the likelihood of a SWF is positive. We will discuss the issue of the interaction of SWF 
assets and reserve holdings below.  
 
3.B. SWFs and National Governance 
What about the role of national governance? Do countries with high or low governance 
tend to establish SWFs?  
To answer this question, we  use the Worldwide Governance Indicators constructed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKM, 2007) which capture key dimensions of governance for 
individual countries:
11  These include the following six subindices: 
(i)  “Voice and Accountability” (VA), which measures the extent to which a country’s 
residents participate in selecting their government, as well as engage in freedom of 
expression;  
 
(ii)  “Political Stability and the Absence of Violence” (PS) , which measures perceptions 
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism;  
 
(iii)  “Government Effectiveness” (GE), a  measure of the quality of public policies and 
services, independence from political pressures, and the credibility of the government 
commitment to these policies;  
 
                                                 
9Among countries with SWFs, ores and metals comprise more than 25% of total exports only for Chile.  
10 Restricting the sample by omitting advanced countries results in a positive coefficient for the GDP per capita 
variable.  Thus, among developing countries, lower income countries are less likely to establish SWFs.  
11 These indicators are available for the years 1996 through 2006 on the Worldwide Governance Indicators Web site 
(http://www.govindicators.org).    10
(iv)  “Regulatory Quality” (RQ), a measure of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies that promote private sector development;  
 
(v)  Rule of Law (RL), a measure of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; and  
 
(vi)  Control of Corruption (CC), measuring the extent to which the government limits 
corruption and rent seeking by elites and private interests. 
 
These variables are constructed on a standardized scale ranging from -2.5 to 2.5.  
(The data are scaled such that a 1 unit change is equivalent to 1 standard deviation of each 
variable’s distribution.) Higher values indicate “better” performance.  Note that the “Voice and 
Accountability” subindex captures the degree of development of democratic institutions. An 
aggregate governance score for each country is given by the average of the six subindices,  
which we shall refer to as the “KKM governance average.” 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of SWFs across countries ranked by their KKM 
governance average level in 2006, the latest date available.
12 The chart does not indicate any 
obvious association between national average governance and the presence of a sovereign wealth 
fund.  In contrast, as shown in Figure 8, SWF countries appear to rank lower on the voice and 
transparency measure, our indicator of democracy performance.  Only 5 of 26 SWFs have 
democracy levels in the top quartile; most are in the bottom half of the sample. 
This finding is supported by Figure 9 which compares governance performance for 
different country groupings – countries with SWFs, other developing countries, and industrial 
countries.
13  It is apparent that countries with SWFs score significantly lower than do industrial 
countries for all governance measures, including the average as well as the subindices. However, 
in comparison with other developing countries, countries with SWFs score somewhat higher, 
                                                 
12 We still exclude countries with populations of less than 250,000. 
13 All figures are unweighted averages of the countries in each grouping. The industrial countries group excludes 
Norway which is included in the SWF group.    11
with the notable exception of voice and accountability where they score much lower. Thus, while 
SWF countries display somewhat better governance on average than other developing countries, 
they are characterized by relatively low democracy performance. 
 Table 3 reports the results of univariate probits involving our national governance 
measures.  Column (1) of the table confirms the absence of any statistical association between 
national governance and SWF likelihood with our country sample. The other columns of Table 3 
report the effects of the individual governance subindices. Observe that none are significant, with 
the notable exception of the voice and accountability index which has a negative as well as 
significant effect on the incidence of SWFs. This confirms the observation drawn from Figures 7 
and 8 that countries with more (less) democratic political institutions are less (more) likely to 
have SWFs.
14  
Table 4 restricts the sample to developing countries only (with the exception of Norway 
which is included in the sample because it has a SWF). Now we find that the governance average 
and most of the other subindices have significantly positive effects on SWF likelihood.
15  
However, the effect of voice and accountability though still negative, is no longer significant. 
This supports the fact that developing countries with better governance, particularly in terms of 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption, are more likely to have 
SWFs.  
 
3.C.  SWFs and Individual Fund Governance 
                                                 
14 If industrial countries are excluded from the sample, then the KKM  and its subindices are generally positive and 
significant. The coefficient on VA is still negative, but no longer significant. 
15 Multivariate probits, with controls for whether a country has current account surpluses or is a fuel or  ore&metal 
exporter, yield similar results for both the full and developing country only samples. 
   12
Thus far we have examined the association of national governance characteristics with 
the incidence of SWFs across countries.  What about the governance characteristics of individual 
SWFs? 
SWFs differ in their strategies for investing abroad and in the information they provide 
about their activities. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund, the most transparent large 
SWF, invests in a wide set of foreign industrial and emerging market securities, with significant 
portions under external management. It generally has not sought out management control of its 
investments, tending to have only small ownership shares in companies.  Temasek, the Singapore 
government’s strategic investment arm, was established in 1974. It takes long-term stakes in 
local and foreign companies and tends to take a more activist approach to its investments. 
Temasek has released some information about its financial performance since 2004, but the 
available information has been confined to consolidated accounts that do not disclose flows 
between subsidiary investments and omits historical financial data before 2001. Other sovereign 
funds have been more opaque.  
The degree of transparency displayed by a SWF at home and abroad has implications for 
the extent and nature of its activities.   In more democratic countries, political contestability 
implies that the SWF agenda and investment goals should be more aligned with the domestic  
electorate, implying greater demand for domestic transparency.  In these circumstances, greater 
domestic transparency may increase the electorate’s support for the SWF, thereby expanding the 
resources delegated to it.  In less democratic countries, SWF management may reflect the 
preferences of a narrow power group, and the determination of internal transparency is more 
involved.  Too little transparency may backfire by fueling popular dissent, encouraging political 
instability, and possibly reducing the tenure of the government and its management team by its   13
forceful removal from office.   Yet, “high” domestic transparency may entail another cost to the 
government in the form of greater discontent, inducing other power groups to challenge the size 
and the mandate of the SWF.  In these circumstances, greater transparency may lessen the 
reported foreign assets allocated to SWF for management.  In the appendix model we discuss 
how the degree of a country’s transparency may affect the size of the foreign asset base entrusted 
to a SWF’s management. 
A SWF also may face a complex trade off regarding the degree of international 
transparency it displays, i.e. the degree to which its investment strategy and holdings are 
transparent to the global financial system.  On the one hand, if the SWF benefits from access to 
superior talent and information, greater transparency may reduce the effectiveness of any 
proprietary strategy used by the fund.  On the other hand, inadequate international transparency 
tends to reduce the hospitality shown towards foreign direct and portfolio investment in the host 
country and possibly encourage local efforts to reduce a SWF’s access to profitable business 
opportunities.
16   
To provide empirical content to the role of governance in the activities of SWFs, we next 
examine the governance characteristics of the individual SWFs in our sample described in Table 
1. We first explore the question as to how the governance of individual SWFs compares with the 
KKM national governance measures. To do so we make use of Truman (2008) governance 
scores for nonpension sovereign wealth funds.
17 He constructs 4 subindices measuring the 
behavior of individual SWFs in various dimensions: 
                                                 
16 These considerations suggest that the degree of transparency displayed by a SWF may be determined 
endogenously in an effort to maximize foreign investment opportunities. We allude to this possibility in the 
appendix, but do not model it.  
 
17 Truman also collects governance data for ten sovereign pension funds. We will compare the results for sovereign 
wealth and sovereign pension funds below.     14
(i)  “Fund Accountability and Transparency,” which measures the clarity of investment 
strategy, investment activities, reporting, and audits; 
 
(ii)   “Fund Structure,” measuring clarity of the fund’s basic structure, including its 
objectives, fiscal treatment, and independence from management of the country’s 
international reserves;  
 
(iii)  “Fund Behavior,” measuring the fund’s approach to managing its portfolio and using 
leverage and derivatives. 
 
(iv)  “Fund Management,” which measures the existence of investment guidelines and the 
role of the government and SWF managers in executing them.
18 
 
Higher values of “Fund Transparency” represent increased SWF accountability and 
transparency. Higher values of “Fund Structure” correspond to clearer guidelines for the 
structure and scope of SWF activities.   Higher values of “Fund Management ” imply more 
disclosure about the governance environment. Higher values of “Fund Behavior” indicate that 
the SWF utilizes more advanced investment and risk management strategies. In addition, Truman 
reports a total score for each SWF, constructed as the sum of the individual index scores. We 
interpret an individual fund’s total score as a measure of the quality of its overall governance.  It 
should be noted that the 4 subindices are not weighted equally in constructing the total score; 
“Fund Accountability and Transparency” accounts for almost half of the total, implying that 
variations across funds in their total governance score primarily reflect differences in 
accountability and transparency.
19   
Table 5 reports the correlations of KKM national governance measures and the Truman 
governance measures for the SWFs in our sample. For countries with more than one SWF we use 
                                                 
18 We have changed Truman’s actual label for this subindex from “governance” to “management” in order to avoid 
confusion when referring to Truman’s total score as a measure of overall governance.  
19 The maximum number of points in the four categories are 14, 8, 6, and 5, respectively, giving an overall score 
maximum of 33. Hence transparency accounts for 42 (=14/33) percent of the total score.    15
the scores for the SWF fund with the largest amount of assets.  There is no score data on SWFs 
in Saudi Arabia, Gabon, and Libya, as indicated in Table 1, leaving 26 SWF observations.
20  
Observe from Table 5 that the KKM governance average and the Truman total score 
measures are positively, but weakly, correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.28; the p value is 
0.16). The top row of the table reveals that almost all of this correlation is attributable to the 
voice and accountable variable, which is strongly correlated with the Truman total score (the 
coefficient is 0.56; the p value is 0.00) as well as with the Truman subindices.  Thus countries 
with high (low) national democracy ratings tend to have sovereign wealth funds with high (low) 
Truman governance scores as well. In particular, countries with more democratic institutions also 
tend to have SWFs that display more accountability and transparency.   
The scatter plots in Figures 10 and 11 give further insight. Figure 10 plots the KKM 
average national governance measure against Truman’s total SWF governance score for each 
SWF.  First, observe that there is a relatively wide dispersion in the Truman fund governance 
scores plotted on the horizontal axis.  SWFs in Norway, Hong Kong, Chile as well as in 
Khazakistan, Azerbaijan, and Timur-Leste all score high in terms of the Truman total score 
measure, implying relatively effective governance and transparency. At the other end of the scale 
are the SWFs in the oil-producing countries of United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Brunei, and Oman, 
as well as in Sudan, Venezuela, Iran, and Nigeria. 
Second, observe that the scatter plot and fitted regression line suggest a weak positive 
correlation between the KKM and Truman measures. This is consistent with the correlation 
results in Table 5: countries characterized by better governance tend to have SWFs displaying 
better overall governance.  The weakness of the correlation appears attributable to the outlier 
                                                 
20 For the  SWFs in Truman’s full sample the total score averages 15.1 for SWFs; for our sample of 26 countries, 
which uses only the scores for the largest SWF in each country, the average is 19.1 Truman’s average for 10 SPFs is 
29.2. For his full sample of 33 SWFs and 10 SPFs pooled together the average is 18.3.   16
observations in the upper left quadrant – the “older” fuel-producing countries of the United arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Brunei, Oman – and the outlying observations in the lower right quadrant – the 
“newer” fuel-producing states of Russia, Khazakistan, Azerbaijan, and Timur-Leste.  The first 
set of countries have relatively high KKM governance scores and low Truman fund scores, while 
the second set have relatively low KKM governance scores and high Truman fund scores. 
Figure 11 gives additional insight with a scatter plot of the KKM voice and accountability 
subindex vs. Truman’s total SWF score. Here we see that the oil- producing countries of the 
UAE, Qatar, Brunei, and Oman have relatively low democracy levels (as indicated by the 
downward pointing arrow). Thus despite relatively high overall KKM governance levels, the 
“older” fuel producing countries have relatively low democracy scores as well as SWFs with low 
Truman fund governance scores, particularly in terms of transparency and accountability. In 
contrast, the SWFs of the newer fuel-producing countries – Russia, Khazakistan, Azerbaijan, and  
Timur-Leste, – who also have low democracy scores, have higher Truman fund scores, i.e. they 
are more transparent than the sovereign funds in the older oil-producing countries. Why might 
this be so?  One possible explanation is that countries that have only recently begun to develop 
their fuel resources have a greater incentive to foster more global integration by establishing 
institutions, such as SWFs, with more transparency and accountability. It is easier to change the 
level of transparency of a fund than to change a country’s political system. 
Some have suggested that sovereign funds may face more issues when investing abroad 
the greater the extent to which the practices of their SWFs diverge from those of domestic 
institutions managing public funds in the recipient countries. 
Further insight can be obtained from Figures 12 and 13 which present the Truman and 
KKM measures for different SWF country groupings – “old” oil-exporting countries with   17
SWFs,
21  Norway, and other SWFs. For comparison, we also report results for 10 sovereign 
pension funds (SPFs) in industrial countries (as well as the sub-national SWFs in the U.S. and 
Canada), using data from Truman (2008)
22 The Truman subindices are normalized to reflect the 
percent fraction (up to 100) of the maximum score possible for each subindex.  
 Figure 12 shows that the older oil-exporting countries have lower Truman fund 
governance scores, primarily because of limited transparency and accountability, in comparison 
to other SWF countries. All are well below the standards of sovereign pension funds as well as 
Norway’s SWF. Figure 13 shows that the older-exporting countries generally have better KKM 
governance levels than those of other SWFS (except Norway, of course), but lower democracy 
levels.  These figures illustrate how the practices of many large existing sovereign funds, 
particularly those originating in less democratic countries, differ from the practices of pension 
funds as well as Norway's government fund. Clearly, there is still a great difference between the 
governance standards of the economies in which SWFs have been established and the 
governance standards of the industrial economies in which they are seeking to invest. 
3.D.  Determinants of SWF Asset Size 
As shown in Figure 2, SWFs vary greatly in asset size. What explains the size differences 
of SWFs?  Funds established a long time ago presumably have had more time to accumulate 
assets. Increasing oil prices and oil export revenues contribute to national asset accumulation 
over time as well. 
The bar chart in Figure 14 illustrates this by depicting SWF asset holdings (and foreign 
reserves) as a share of GDP, ranked by the duration of the fund (defined as the number of years 
                                                 
21 This grouping consists of the Gulf countries – Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates – and 
Brunei (Saudi Arabia is excluded from the Truman scores because of the lack of data on this measure).   
22 The SPF sample also includes China’s National Social Security Fund. Omitting this SPF does not affect the 
results.   18
between 2008 and the fund’s establishment date, given in Table 1). Observe that the largest 
funds are those who are the oldest – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, 
Singapore, and Brunei. (Qatar, whose SWF was established more recently – in 2003 – is an 
outlier.) 
Tables 6 and 7 confirm these findings with cross-section regressions of SWF asset size 
relative to GDP for the sample of 26 countries with SWFs (excluding Kiribati, Sao Tome, and 
Timur-Leste because of lack of data). We include fuel exports as a share of GDP as well as fund 
duration as explanatory variables 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show that the size of a country’s SWF is greater the 
higher the country’s fuel export revenue and the longer the fund’s duration. These effects are 
significant at the 10% level or better. The remaining columns of Table 6 report the effect of 
Truman fund scores on asset size.  Controlling for oil and duration, lower Truman fund 
governance scores appear to be associated with higher fund size (though only the effect of 
“Structure” is significant, at 10%).
23 These results provide somewhat weak evidence that the less 
transparent SWFs are relatively large in size. 
  Table 7 reports the effects of the KKM national governance measures on SWF size, 
controlling or oil revenue and duration.  Here we find that that better national governance is 
associated with larger fund size, with the notable exception of the “voice and accountability” 
measure which is negative (though not significant).
24  This is consistent with earlier findings 
concerning the likelihood of a country having a SWF. Countries for which oil revenue plays less 
of a role in explaining the accumulation of SWF foreign assets tend to have better governance as 
well as more democratic institutions, compared to other developing countries. Conversely, 
                                                 
23 The same general results are obtained with univariate regressions without the oil or duration variables. 
24 With controls for oil or duration, the governance variables are still positive, but insignificant.    19
countries for which oil revenue plays more of a role, particularly “older” oil exporters, appear to 
be characterized by higher levels of governance in terms of government, regulatory, and legal 
effectiveness, but relatively less democratic institutions.  
  The result that the largest funds appear to be characterized by relatively low standards of 
transparency and accountability is part of the basis for why these funds have encountered 
concerns when seeking to expand their presence in foreign financial markets. 
 
3.E. SWF Assets and Foreign Reserves 
As countries choose to entrust more of their sovereign wealth to investment funds it is 
expected to affect official reserve accumulation, with funds likely shifting away from reserves 
held by the central bank. Is there any evidence of such a shift? 
Figure 14 plots the ratio of SWF assets (as of end 2007) and of foreign reserves to GDP 
(as of 2006) in the order of decreasing fund duration.
25 Observe that the older SWFs not only 
have relatively high SWF asset /GDP ratios, they also have relatively low reserve/GDP ratios as 
compared to the more newly established SWFs (with the exception of Qatar). Figure 15 supports 
this observation by plotting the ratio of SWF assets to reserve assets.
26  
To examine the interaction of SWF assets and reserves more formally, we report results 
of a panel regression of the determinants of foreign reserves relative to GDP over the period 
1985 to 2006. The explanatory variables include reserve volatility (measured by the standard 
deviation of reserve holding changes over five years), the ratio of imports to GDP, the ratio of 
                                                 
25 There are no reserve data for Iran, Kiribati, and Sao Tome. These countries are excluded from Figure 14. 
26 Ziemba (2008) reports that the official reserves of GCC countries (excluding Saudi Arabia), Saudi Arabia, and 
Kuwait were roughly $100 billion, $ 30 billion, and $17 billion, respectively in early 2008.  These figures are well 
below reserve holdings of the central banks in the region.   20
M2 to reserves, and the occurrence of currency crises.
27. Because of data limitations the panel 
includes only 22 countries with a SWF. 
Table 8 reports random effects estimates of the panel with a set of year dummies and 
error clustering at the country level.  As shown in col. (1), reserve holdings rise with the 
import/GDP and M2/reserve ratios.  These effects are as expected: reserve holdings should be 
higher the greater the need to cover the costs of imports and the greater the vulnerability to 
liquidity crisis associated with higher short-term domestic currency liabilities of the banking 
system relative to reserve holdings. Reserve holdings decline with the occurence of a currency 
crisis. The effect of reserve volatility is insignificant. 
Column (1) also includes a 0-1 dummy variable – “SWF present” which has a value of 1 
for those years in which a country has a SWF.
28 The coefficient on this variable is positive and 
significant, indicating that the presence of SWF raises the level of reserve holdings.
29  This does 
not support the view that establishment of a SWF leads to lower official reserve levels over time.  
One possible reason is that most of the SWFs in the sample have been established relatively 
recently, leaving insufficient time for effects on the level of central bank reserve holdings to 
occur.  
  Column (2) of Table 8 adds an additional dummy variable -- SWF “older” oil exporter --  
which has a value of 1 only for those countries which had SWFs in place before 1990 that were 
also significant oil exporters. Here we find that negative coefficient. This implies that, relative to 
all SWF countries, oil-exporting countries with SWFs of long duration, hold lower levels of 
                                                 
27 We thank Yin-Wong Cheung and Hiro Ito for providing the data for some of these variables; see Cheung and Ito 
(2007) on currency crises. We also considered the use of a measure of the opportunity costs to holding reserves 
(defined as the domestic lending rate minus the U.S. Treasury bill rate), but the absence of a domestic interest rate 
for many of the SWF countries in our sample, lead us to omit it.   
28 The value of this dummy is set equal to 1 in 2006 for any country which established a SWF in 2007 or 2008. 
29 Ideally, we would prefer to be able to utilize time-varying data for SWF assets.  Unfortunately we only have the 
single data point for SWF assets of year end 2007.     21
reserves. This is consistent with the view that over time countries with SWFs will tend to hold 
relatively less reserves.   
In an Appendix we compares the optimal patterns of portfolio diversification managed by 
a central bank and a sovereign wealth fund, possibly acting as an agent for the Treasury.   
We first present a simple model with which we compare the optimal degree of 
diversification depending on the authorities’ utility function.  We assume that the objective of the 
bank is to maintain financial stability by solely focusing on the objective of reducing the 
probability of sudden stops.
30 In contrast, we presume that the Treasury, acting through a SWF, 
maximizes the expected utility of a representative domestic agent In this framework we show 
that the central banks’s focus on financial stability implies that it will place a higher weight on 
the downside risk of sudden stops than will the SWF.  Consequently, the bank tends to bias its 
portfolio strategy towards holding more of the safe asset, whereas the SWF opts for greater 
diversification towards risky foreign assets. We also show how the diversification gap between 
the strategies of the bank and SWF is affected by various parameters of the economy, such as the 
volatility of equity returns.  
We follow with a more elaborate model of joint decision making in which we treat the 
Treasury as the dominant player and assume that it sets the total level of foreign assets managed 
by the central bank, but delegates to the central bank the responsibility for maintaining financial 
stability through the composition of its portfolio. Conditional on the actions of the central bank, 
the Treasury decides what level of public foreign assets to entrust to the central bank for 
management as well as the composition of the residual share of the country’s public foreign 
                                                 
30 We abstract from other possible central bank objectives, such targeting inflation under flexible 
exchange rate regime.  We also do not model deeper reasons for our assignment of objectives, such as a 
possible bias towards nominating a conservative central bank governor with a narrower policy focus than 
the representative agent (see Rogoff, 1985; Walsh, 1995; Obstfeld, 1996; and Aizenman and Glick, 
2008).    22
assets managed through the SWF. In these circumstances, we find that the assignment of the 
objective to financial stability to the central bank tends to increase the gap between the optimal 
diversification patterns of the bank and the SWF. 
We also discuss how the degree of a country’s internal and external transparency affects 
the country’s foreign asset returns and management.   
 
4.  Implications of SWFs for Global Financial Markets 
There have been growing concerns about how the size and composition of SWF 
portfolios may affect global financial markets. On the one hand, SWFs are viewed as institutions 
with relatively long investment horizons, generally operating with little leverage, thus providing 
a stable source of cross-border liquidity for the global financial system. In fact, Kotter and Lel 
(2008) show that SWF acquisition announcements raise the returns of target firms, particularly if 
they are relatively transparent.
31 This finding suggests that investors use voluntary SWF 
disclosure as a signal of the quality of screening and monitoring by SWFs about investment 
opportunities. 
Moreover, during the recent 2007-08 global financial crisis SWFs have been a source of 
new capital to foreign banks and investment firms, particularly in the United States. Between 
November 2007 and January 2008, SWFs from emerging markets injected more than $44 billion 
of capital into needy financial institutions in advance economies; these investments accounted 
for roughly 3/4 of the total capital raised by target companies over period (FRBNY).  In general, 
they have been structured to keep individual investors' ownership stakes below the 5 or 10% 
limits that would invite closer regulatory attention. 
                                                 
31 Specifically, they show that SWF acquisition announcements raise the risk-adjusted returns of target firms by 2.1 
percent on average, and by 3.5% if they implement independent audits or make annual reports publicly available.     23
On the other hand, there are concerns reflecting the view that the growing size of SWFs 
matters and that sovereign fund management may be motivated by non-economic considerations, 
deviating from conventional wealth maximization. Apprehension about the size effect of funds, 
both private and public, is not new, reflecting the possibility that large funds may use their 
market power strategically, potentially leading to greater financial instability. An example of 
these concerns is the alleged role of large private hedge funds in coordinating speculative attacks 
on the British pound and other currencies participating in the European exchange rate 
mechanism in the early 1990s. The extra dimension added by SWFs is the possibility that 
sovereign investors may use their strategic leverage for narrow nationalistic objectives (Summers 
2007, Kimmitt 2008). The concern is that financial globalization has reached the point where the 
sheer size of foreign savings may distort sovereigns’ incentives, shifting them from beneficial 
diversification toward zero-sum game policies. These may include supporting domestic “national 
champion” firms, buying controlling positions in foreign firms with proprietary knowledge, or 
increasing control of financial and tangible infrastructure abroad (telecommunication, energy, 
ports, etc.).  
Such developments may also lead to the proliferation of capital controls and financial 
protectionism, ultimately risking international trade in goods and services. Already, 
globalization, despite its benefits, has raised sensitivities around the world. In particular, there is 
rising opposition in many countries to the control or major stakes that state-controlled SWFs are 
taking in foreign private companies. The adverse political reaction to efforts by China’s state 
owned oil enterprise CNOOC to acquire the U.S. oil firm Unocal in 2005 and by the United Arab 
Emirates’ DP World to acquire several major U.S. ports are well known. More recent financial 
investments, such as Abu Dhabi Investment Authority’s investment in Citigroup, have prompted   24
less concern, in part because of assurances that no control or active management of the target 
firm would be sought. Emerging markets also at times have expressed sensitivity to certain 
investments by other emerging markets. Temasek’s purchase of a controlling stake in the Thai 
telecom firm Shin Corp. from the family of then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in January 
2006 sparked off a political crisis in Thailand.  
As a result of these concerns, a range of policies have been proposed. Some observers 
call for imposing stringent transparency requirements on SWFs, well above the present 
requirements on private financial funds (Truman 2007). In this connection, the U.S. Treasury has 
suggested that the International Monetary Fund and World Bank play an oversight role to limit 
the systemic risks of unregulated SWFs, including the formulation of best practice guidelines. In 
the Spring of 2008 twenty-five SWFs formed an international working group, facilitated by the 
IMF, to develop a set of voluntary best practices and guidelines (IMF 2008).  A preliminary 
agreement was announced in early September of this year. 
Others have proposed greater scrutiny of foreign government entities seeking operational 
control of companies in which they invest, particularly if they choose to exercise the voting 
rights of their equity shares. Accordingly, some have advocated that SWFs should be allowed to 
invest only in nonvoting equity shares (Buiter 2007). In addition, some call for restricting SWFs’ 
operations to reciprocal arrangements, where the ability of a country to buy foreign assets would 
be conditioned on granting similar access to foreign funds (Economist 2007).  
Further insight into this issue is gained by noting that economic theory suggests that the 
diversification benefits associated with increased globalization can be obtained best by buying a 
share of a “global fund,” composed of all the traded assets of all countries. This suggests that the 
expanding role of SWFs may be best accommodated by their purchasing shares of a fund   25
composed of the indexes of all the countries forming the global financial system. Such 
diversification provides the best mechanism for eliminating idiosyncratic risks. Short of 
engaging in potentially destabilizing zero-sum speculation, large players approaching the size of 
SWFs should not expect to get more than the gains associated with holding such wide “country 
funds.” 
Taking the insight provided by this benchmark seriously, a policy of encouraging SWFs 
to invest in well-diversified index instruments, such as the S&P 500,Wilshire 5000, Dow Jones, 
Wilshire Global Total Market Index, etc., has the advantage of providing a workable solution to 
challenges associated with SWFs.
32 The requirement for stringent transparency tests of SWFs 
may be unrealistic, due to costly monitoring and collection of information. Channeling the 
activities of SWFs into widely diversified country funds offers diversification gains to investors, 
while minimizing the exposure of a given country to strategic “cherry picking,” that is, 
selectively buying control in entities due to narrow nationalistic objectives. One may also view it 
as a stepping stone towards deeper global diversification, as it may encourage the proliferation of 
country indexes in countries that are interested in gaining from financial globalization. Such a 
policy could be implemented either with the guidance of international financial institutions or as 




This paper presents statistical analysis supporting stylized facts about sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs). Evidence is provided about the association of SWFs with a country’s fuel export 
performance and current account surpluses. The paper also analyzes the degree to which 
measures of SWF governance and transparency compare with national governance standards.  
                                                 
32 This suggestion was first made in Aizenman and Glick (2007).   26
We find that countries with SWFs score significantly lower than do industrial countries 
for various governance measures. However, in comparison with other developing countries, 
countries with SWF countries are characterized by somewhat higher governance standards, with 
the exception of voice and accountability – a measure of democratic institutional development -- 
where they score much lower. Thus, while SWF countries display somewhat better governance 
on average than other developing countries, they are characterized by relatively low democracy 
performance, particularly in fuel-exporting countries.  
It is also shown that the governance performance of individual SWFs is weakly 
correlated with measures of national governance. That is, SWFs funds tend to operate in 
accordance with national norms of governance, with the notable exception of some fuel-intensive 
exporting countries which are characterized by relatively low democratic performance. In 
particular, older SWFs established in fuel-exporting countries appear to be relatively less 
transparent, while newer SWFs established in fuel-exporting countries appear to be more 
transparent. We suggest that countries that have only recently begun to develop their fuel 
resources have a greater incentive to foster more global integration by establishing institutions, 
such as SWFs, with more transparency and accountability. It is easier to change the level of 
transparency of a fund than to change a country’s political system. 
We also show how the practices of many large existing sovereign funds, particularly 
those originating in less democratic countries, differ from the practices of pension funds in 
industrial countries. Clearly, there is still great difference between the governance standards of 
the economies in which SWFs have been established and the governance standards of  the 
economies in which they are seeking to invest.   27
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that over time countries may transfer a 
greater share of the public sector’s foreign assets from official reserves into SWFs.  The ultimate 
impact that formation of SWFs will have on the dynamics of hoarding international foreign 
reserves requires more data and time to resolve.  
The present global financial crisis illustrates the importance of the self insurance services 
provided by holding international reserves as well as the usefulness of policies that channel some 
share of windfall gains associated with terms of trade improvements into sovereign wealth funds  
(e.g., see the experience of Chile in recent years).  While the recent drop in global commodity 
prices and equity returns may have reduced the relative appeal of SWFs, a resumption of global 
growth may restore their attractiveness.  However, if the “great moderation” decades are indeed 
over and volatility in financial markets remains highs, monetary authorities may place a bigger  
weight on holding more reserves as a means of minimizing the expected costs of sudden stop 
events.   28
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Note: KKM governance categories defined as GE=government effectiveness, PS= political stability 
and the absence of violence, VA= voice and accountability, ROL= rule of law, RQ= regulatory 
quality, and COC= control of corruption. Higher values associated with “better” governance. 
 



































Truman Total Score vs. KKM Governance Average Score









































Truman Total Score vs. KKM Voice and Accountability Score




Total Score  36
Figure 12. 
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Note: KKM governance categories defined as GE=government effectiveness, PS= political 
stability and the absence of violence, VA= voice and accountability, ROL= rule of law, 
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Figure 14. 
SWF Assets/GDP  and Foreign Reserves/GDP (percent)
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Table 1.  Sovereign Wealth Fund Sample  




 ($ bil.) 
United Arab Emirates   Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and others  1976  817
a
Singapore GIC,  Temasek  1981  375
b 
Norway Government  Pension  Fund–Global  1990  375 
Saudi Arabia
c  Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency  1952  270 
Kuwait  Kuwait Investment Authority  1953  213 
China   China Investment Corporation  2007  201 
Russia  Reserve Fund, National Welfare Fund  2008  202 
Hong Kong  Exchange Fund Investment Portfolio  1993  139 
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority  2005  60 
Libya
c  Libyan Investment Authority  2006  50 
Algeria  Revenue Regulation Fund  2000  47 
Brunei  Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency  1983  35 
Korea  Korea Investment Corporation  2005  30 
Kazakhstan  National Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan  2000  23 
Venezuela  National Development Fund, Macro Stabilization Fund  2005  22 
Malaysia Khazanah  Nasionald  1993  18 
Nigeria  Excess Crude Account  2003  17 
Chile  Economic and Social Stabilization Fund  2006  15 
Oman  State General Reserve Fund  1980  13 
Iran  Oil Stabilization Fund  2000  10 
Botswana Pula  Fund  1993  7 
Mexico  Oil Income Stabilization Fund  2000  5 
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan  1999  2 
Timor-Leste Petroleum  Fund  2005  2 
Trinidad & Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization Fund  2007  2 
Kiribati  Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund  1956  1 
Gabon
c  Fund for Future Generations  1998  0.4 
Sudan  Oil Revenue Stabilization Account  2002  0.1 
São Tomé & Príncipe  National Oil Account  2004  0.02 
TOTAL     2909 
 
a Midpoint of estimate range for Abu Dhabi Investment Authority plus sum of assets of Abu Dhabi 
International Petroleum Investment Company,  Mubadala Development Company, Dubai  DIFC Investments,  
Dubai International Capital,  Investment Corporation of Dubai, Istithmar World.  
b Midpoint of estimates for GIC plus assets of Temasek 
c Excluded from Truman’s scoreboard. 
Source Truman (2008). Data are from the end of 2007 or the most recent date available. Where more than one 
fund exists per country, size computed as total of all funds, with date  established given by largest fund. 
   39
 
Table 2.  Determinants of SWF Likelihood 
Explanatory  Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Current account/GDP   0.1.014    0.767  0.758  0.485 
  (0.27)***    (0.27)***  (0.30)**  (0.22)** 
Fuel/total exports   0.464   0.309  0.344  0.351 
   (0.09)***   (0.09)***  (0.10)***  (0.10)*** 
Ore&metals/total exports    -0.312  0.079  0.095  0.137 
    (0.26)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
GDP per capita         0.167  
        (0.18)  
Foreign reserves/GDP        0.378*** 
        (0.14) 
Observations  166 168 169 162 159 154 
Log likelihood  -59.232 -47.503 -71.297 -40.327 -38.446 -32.63 
Pseudo R-sq  0.196 0.344 0.017 0.435 0.457 0.522 
 
Note: The table reports the change in the probability of existence of a SWF in 2007 or 2008 in response to 
a 1 unit change in the variable evaluated at the mean of all variables (x100) to convert into percentages 
with associated standard errors (for hypothesis of no effect) in parentheses below. Significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using robust errors. Constants included, but not 
reported. Sample confined to countries with populations greater than 250,000 people in 2006.   40
 
Table 3.   Determinants of SWF Likelihood: KKM Governance Indicators  
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
KKM Governance Average  1.545        
  (2.85)        
Government Effectiveness   3.671       
   ( 2 . 4 7 )        
Political Stability    2.342      
    (2.94)      
Voice and Accountability     -5.577     
     ( 2 . 7 3 ) * *      
Rule of Law      2.252    
      ( 2 . 6 3 )     
Regulatory Quality       2.609   
       ( 2 . 7 5 )    
Control of Corruption         0.02328 
        ( 2 . 6 2 )  
Observations  171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
Log likelihood  -74.449 -73.658 -74.247 -72.608 -74.245 -74.139 -74.212 
Pseudo R-sq  0.002 0.012 0.005 0.027 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 
 
Table 4.   Determinants of SWF Likelihood: KKM Governance Indicators  
Developing Countries Only 
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
KKM Governance Average  7.897        
  (4.18)*        
Government Effectiveness   10.858       
   (3.50)***       
Political Stability    5.348      
    (3.59)      
Voice and Accountability     -4.584     
     ( 3 . 6 8 )      
Rule of Law      9.051    
      ( 3 . 9 3 ) * *     
Regulatory Quality       7.892   
       ( 3 . 7 3 ) * *    
Control of Corruption         10.333 
        ( 4 . 0 2 ) * *  
Observations  148 148 148 148 148 148 148 
Log likelihood  -66.907 -64.416 -67.511 -68.037 -65.968 -66.258 -65.375 









                         Truman SWF Governance Scores 








































Accountability  0.33  0.54 0.49 0.58 0.56 
  (0.10)* (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
        
Political Stability -0.03  0.06 0.16 0.29 0.15 
  (0.88)  (0.79) (0.42) (0.15) (0.46) 
        
Government 
Effectiveness  0.10  0.00 0.37 0.28 0.27 
 (0.63)  (0.99)  (0.06)*  (0.17)  (0.18) 
        
Regulatory 
Quality  0.05  0.03 0.32 0.21 0.23 
  (0.81)  (0.89) (0.11) (0.30) (0.26) 
        
Rule of Law  -0.03  0.01 0.22 0.33 0.18 
 (0.89)  (0.96)  (0.28)  (0.10)*  (0.38) 
        
Control of 
Corruption  -0.01  -0.02 0.26 0.25 0.19 
  (0.98)  (0.93) (0.19) (0.22) (0.36) 
        
KKM 
Governance Avg.   0.07  0.10 0.33 0.35 0.28 
 (0.74)  (0.63)  (0.10) (0.08)  * (0.16) 
        
        
 
Note: Table reports correlation of Truman (2008) scores for 26 sovereign (nonpension) wealth funds 
listed in Table 1 with Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi  (2007) national governance measures for 
corresponding countries of origin. P-values in parentheses below. Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% indicated 
by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 6.   Determinants of SWF Assets/GDP with Truman SWF Scores  
Explanatory  Variable  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Fuel exports/GDP   3.106  2.186 2.013 2.451  1.761 1.962 2.249 
  (1.485)** (1.282)  (1.188)*  (1.587)  (1.075)* (1.080)* (1.240)* 
SWF Duration    3.932 6.367 6.181  6.154 6.355 6.250 
   (2.057)*  (2.366)**  (2.329)** (1.916)***  (2.131)***  (2.471)** 
Total Fund Score     -1.920       
     (2.133)       
Fund Behavior      4.620     
      (14.515)     
Fund Structure        -19.853    
        (10.523)*    
Fund Transparency         -12.860   
         (15.845)   
Fund Management          - 1 . 0 9 0  
          ( 4 . 0 7 6 )  
Observations  26  26 23 23  23 23 23 




Table 7.   Determinants of SWF Assets/GDP with KKM Governance Indicators 
Explanatory  Variable  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Fuel exports/GDP   3.032  3.310 2.379 2.690  2.944 3.032 3.076 
  (1.406)** (1.413)**  (1.260)*  (1.542)* (1.372)**  (1.473)*  (1.332)** 
SWF Duration  2.191  2.090 2.875 3.703  1.811 2.117 1.389 
  (1.720)  (1.606) (1.638)*  (2.021)*  (1.813) (1.927) (1.720) 
Governance Average  66.937         
  (25.777)**        
Govt. Effectiveness    71.428        
    (25.107)***       
Political Stability     52.097       
     (18.447***       
Voice and Accountability      30.077     
      (22.159)     
Rule of Law        60.192    
        (22.478)**    
Regulatory Quality         60.223   
         (25.449)**   
Control of  Corruption           68.669 
          (24.301)  **
Observations  26  26 26 26  26 26 26 
R2   0.502  0.545 0.479 0.375  0.484 0.490 0.546   43
 
 
Table 8.    Determinants of Foreign Reserves/GDP 
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2) 
Reserve volatility   -0.151 -0.183 
  (0.702)  (0.702) 
Imports/GDP  0.098  0.100 
  (0.043)**  (0.044)** 
M2/GDP  0.124  0.126 
  (0.029)***  (0.029)*** 
Currency Crisis  -2.036  -2.056 
  (0.657)***  (0.658)*** 
SWF present  6.595  7.057 
  (3.189)**  (3.197)** 
SWF “older” oil exporter    -6.618 
    (3.324)** 
Observations   2151 2151 
No. of Countries  116 116 
No. of Countries with SWFs  22 22 
R2 (overall)  0.380 0.414 
 
Table reports results of panel regression over 1985-2006, with random effects and robust errors 
clustered by country. Dummy variable for SWF “older” oil exporters defined as oil-exporting 
country with SWF established before 1990.   44
Appendix:  Modeling Asset Diversification by a Central Bank and Sovereign Wealth Fund 
 
This Appendix compares the optimal patterns of portfolio diversification managed by a 
central bank (CB) and a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), possibly acting as an agent for the 
Treasury.   
We first present a simple model with which we compare the optimal degree of 
diversification depending on the authorities’ utility function.  We assume that the objective of the 
CB is to maintain financial stability by solely focusing on the objective of reducing the 
probability of sudden stops. In contrast, we presume that the Treasury, acting through a SWF, 
maximizes the expected utility of a representative domestic agent. In this framework we show 
that the CB’s focus on financial stability implies that it will place a higher weight on the 
downside risk of sudden stops than will the SWF.  Consequently, the CB tends to bias its 
portfolio strategy towards holding more of the safe asset, whereas the SWF opts for greater 
diversification towards risky foreign assets. We also show how the diversification gap between 
the strategies of the CB and SWF is affected by various parameters of the economy, such as the 
volatility of equity returns.  
We follow with a more elaborate model of joint decision making in which we treat the 
Treasury as the dominant player and assume that it sets the total level of foreign assets managed 
by the central bank, but delegates to the central bank the responsibility for maintaining financial 
stability through the composition of its portfolio. Conditional on the actions of the central bank, 
the Treasury decides what level of public foreign assets to entrust to the central bank for 
management as well as the composition of the residual share of the country’s public foreign 
assets managed through the SWF. In these circumstances, we find that the assignment of the 
objective to financial stability to the CB tends to increase the gap between the optimal 
diversification patterns of the CB and the SWF. 
In the concluding section we discuss how the degree of a country’s internal and external 
transparency affects the country’s foreign asset returns and management.   
 
A1.   The Base Model 
We consider the case where the authorities – either a central bank (CB) or a sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF)  -- determine the diversification of a given initial level of public foreign asset   45
holdings, A, between risk-free international reserves, R  and risky foreign equities F, such that A 
= R + F.  International reserves yield a gross risk-free interest rate  0 r , whereas equity yields a 
stochastic return  0 re δ ++, where e is the expected equity premium and δ  is a zero mean 
equity-return shock.  The realized value of public foreign assets in the following period,  1 A , is 
given by  
  10 () ; 0 Ar Ae F FA δ =+ + ≤ ≤ .           ( A 1 )    
The probability of a sudden stop, φ , depends negatively on the public sector’s foreign assets, A1, 
and positively on the exogenously given  level of aggregate foreign liabilities, B, such that 
[ ] 1 /;' 0 BA φφ φ => .
1  In these circumstances, greater diversification towards foreign equities 
entails growing balance sheet vulnerability, where adverse equity return shocks raise the 
probability of sudden stops.   
The timing of the model is such that after determination of the degree of diversification 
of foreign assets between equities and international reserves, the equity return shock (δ) is 
realized at the beginning of the second period. This realization leads with probability φ  to a 
sudden stop crisis.  In the absence of a crisis, the external debt B is repaid, and output Y1 is 
realized,
2  In the event of a sudden stop crisis, premature costly liquidation occurs, shrinking 
end-of-period output and foreign assets to  11 () ( 1 ) YA τ + − , 10 τ ≥>.
3 
                                                 
1 In the background of the model agents finance long-term investment via banks, which intermediate short-term 
deposits into longer term investment a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The economy is assumed only partially 
integrated with the global financial system, hence some of the liquidity intermediated by the banking system is the 
outcome of inflows of short-term foreign deposits (“hot money”).  Financial integration implies exposure to sudden 
stops and capital flight shocks, which may drain the liquidity of the domestic banking system.  A sudden stop entails 
costly pre-mature liquidation of long term investments, reducing thereby the output associated with these projects.  
The sudden stop probability can be derived endogenously by allowing for liquidity shocks z to foreign borrowing 
(see Aizenman and Lee, 2008).  If z < A1, the liquidity shock is financed by A1, without disrupting long-term 
investment.  If z > A1, it leads to a sudden stop crisis associated with premature and costly liquidation of z – A1 units 
of capital. 
2 The model can be generalized by endogenizing the determination of foreign borrowing B. For example, in a two-
period economy, where second-period output is subject to productivity shocks, the possibility that the country may 
default in the second period with a bad enough productivity shock implies that foreign borrowing is constrained by 
the condition that the cost of funds equals the expected return to lenders (see Aizenman and Marion, 2004). Y1  might 
be expressed as a function of borrowing B in this more general framework. 
3 This is a reduced form of the resources left following the premature liquidation of investments needed to finance 
deposits and capital flight.  To simplify, we assume that that A1 and Y1 shrink at the same rate.  The logic of our 
analysis continues to hold with different shrinkage rates of  A1 and Y1, where the resources left would be 
11 (1 ) (1 ) AY AY τ τ −+−, 10 , 10 AY τ τ ≥> ≥> .   46
Agents are risk averse, with utility U.  The SWF determines the portfolio allocation in 
order to maximize the expected utility of a representative domestic agent,  sw V : 
  [ ] { } [ ] [ ] { } [ ] 11 1 1 1 1 1/ / () ( 1 ) sw VE B A U A Y B B A U A Y φ φτ ⎡⎤ =− + − + + − ⎣⎦ ,   (A2) 
where E is the expectation operator.  Assuming an interior solution with diversification, the FOC 
determining F is:  
[ ] [ ]




/( 1 ) ' ( ) ' ( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( )
'( ) () ( 1 )0 .
()
sw dV dF E U A Y B e U A Y e
B
Ee U A Y B U A Y
A
φ δφ τ τ δ
φδ τ
⎡⎤ =− + −+ + + −− + ⎣⎦
⎡⎤
++ + − − + − = ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
   (A3)   
Rearranging terms, 
  [] [] [ ] {} 11 11 2
1
/' ( ) ( ) ( 1 )
()
B




=− + + −− + − ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
,   (A4) 
where 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] 11 11 /( 1 ) ' ( ) ' ( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( ) Ed U d F E U A Y B e U A Y e φ δφ τ τ δ ⎡⎤ ≡− + −+ + + −− + ⎣⎦ . 
The lefthand size of (A4),  [ ] / Ed Ud F,  is the expected marginal benefit of diversification, i.e. 
the expected marginal utility valuation of the equity premium associated with higher F, 
1 / dA dF e δ =+.  The righthand side of (A4) is the expected marginal cost of diversification, i.e. 
the marginal increase in the probability of a sudden stop,  / dd F φ , times the utility cost of lost 
consumption associated with a sudden stop,  [ ] [ ] 11 11 () ( 1 ) UA Y B U A Y τ + −− + −.
4 
CB management is assumed to focus solely on maintaining financial stability, ignoring 
the effects of its behavior on the utility of domestic agents.  As long as a crisis is avoided, the CB 
manager enjoys a consumption level of  cb C , and utility  [ ] cb UC .  A financial crisis entails a 
penalty at rate  ;1 0 pp ≥> (possibly involving replacement of the central bank manager), 
reducing the central bank’s utility to  [ ] (1 ) cb Uc p − .  In these circumstances, the CB’s expected 
utility is 
 
                                                 
4 Since  '0 φ > , note  that  () ( ) 1 /' / 0 dd F B Ae φφ δ =− + >  for  a negative shock large enough such that  0 e δ + < . 
Note also that the utility cost is positive as long as ( ) 11 A YB τ + > , i.e. the penalty costs are greater than the foregone 
foreign borrowing obligation.   47
  [ ] { } [ ] [ ] { } [ ] 11 1/ / ( 1 ) cb cb cb V E BA UC BA UC p φφ ⎡⎤ =− + − ⎣⎦ .          ( A 5 )  
 














        ( A 6 )    
 
Comparing the FOC of optimal portfolio diversification by the SWF, (A3), to the FOC of the 
CB, (A6), reveals that the CB ignores the possible expected gains to domestic agents induced by 
diversification in the presence of a positive equity premium.  Instead, the CB minimizes the 
downside risk associated with adverse equity shocks, recognizing that such shocks would 
increase the leverage ratio B/A1 at a rate proportionate to the equity portfolio share (since (A1) 
implies  () 10 /( ) / AAr e FA δ =++ ), thereby increasing the probability of sudden stops in bad 
times.  This suggests that the CB will opt for much less diversification into foreign equities than 
the SWF.   
  Further insight is gained by considering a simple example, where the equity shock, δ , 
takes on two values, either δ  or  δ − , each with probability one half, implying mean value 0 and 
standard deviation δ .  Agents’ utility displays constant relative risk aversion, with a CRRA 
coefficientβ .  The left panel of Figure A1 plots the optimal share of foreign equities in a 
portfolio managed by the SWF (top curve) and the CB (bottom curve), each as a function of 
volatilityδ , for the case where the initial public asset position is A = 1, well below the level of 
external liabilities, B, assumed to be 1.6. With the initial foreign public asset level A normalized 
to 1, F also measures the equity share of the portfolio.  For δ = 0.2, the SWF’s diversification 
rate is roughly 87%, whereas the CB opts for a much lesser degree of diversification (about 
15%).  Figure A2 plots the association between the equity shock and the sudden stop probability 
for the CB (dotted line) and SWF (bold line), given the optimal equity share F chosen when δ = 
0.2, for varying realizations of the equity shock.  Note that the limited diversification strategy 
pursued by the CB results in a relatively low expected probability of sudden stops, less than 0.1. 
In contrast, the greater holdings of risky foreign equities by the SWF exposes the economy to the 
greater downside risk of a sudden stop in bad times, e.g. for a δ realization of  -0.4, the 
probability of a crisis is almost 0.3.   48
  Our framework suggests that, for relatively low levels of public foreign assets, assigning 
portfolio management independence to the CB may advantageous. However, for a large enough 
asset base A, the opportunity cost associated with the limited portfolio diversification of the CB 
would be high enough to induce the authorities to establish a SWF, treating it as an agent for the 
Treasury in pursuit of greater returns.  In these circumstances, the SWF would opt for much 
higher greater investment in foreign equities, while the CB would manage its assets with limited 
diversification, so as to minimize the downside risk of sudden stop crises.  The right panel of 
Figure A1 illustrates the effects of the size of the asset base on diversification choices, by tripling 
A from 1 to 3. As can be observed, the higher level of public assets has a negligible effect on the 
CB’s demand for equities, but induces a large increase in the SWF’s equity demand.   
 
A2. Delegation of Financial Stability Objective to Central Bank   
  This section extends the base model, recognizing the possibility that the CB has a 
comparative advantage in avoiding sudden stops and maintaining financial stability, whereas the 
SWF has a comparative advantage in managing risky portfolios.  We continue to assume that A, 
the initial foreign assets of the public sector, and B, aggregate foreign borrowing, are 
exogenously determined. We now assume that the Treasury, is the dominant player, determining 
the split of the given level of public foreign assets A, between the management of the SWF and 
the CB, while also managing the composition of the SWF’s portfolio of foreign assets: 
swc b AA A =+;  where , swc b AA  denote the initial assets managed by the SWF and CB, 
respectively.  Note that if A is given and the CB determines cb A , then sw A  is determined as well. 
The realized value of assets under CB management in the following period are 1,cb A . The 
CB diversifies its portfolio between foreign reserves ( cb R ) and foreign equities ( cb F ), 
cb cb cb ARF =+ , implying   
  1, () cb o cb cb Ar AeF δ =+ +,          ( A 1 ’ )  
where eis the expected equity premium and δ is a zero mean equity-return shock for investment 
in risky assets by the central bank. 
The Treasury has a comparative advantage in active management of the external 
portfolio, resulting in an equity premium and equity return shock ( , sws w e δ ) that differs from 
those affecting the CB’s portfolio,  , e δ .  This reflects the possibility that the CB diversifies by   49
passive portfolio investment channels (such as investing in broad and relatively liquid foreign 
stock indexes), whereas Treasury diversities by more active portfolio management, including 
FDI and possibly less liquid projects, with possible exposure to higher expected returns, but with 
the downside of more volatile returns (hence  ;
sw sw ee δ δ σ σ ≥≥ ). Accordingly, the realized value 
of assets under SW management in the following period is  1,sw A :    
1, () sw o sw sw sw sw A rA e F δ =+ +          ( A 1 ” )    
As before, the probability of a sudden stop,φ , depends positively on the exogenously 
given level of aggregate foreign liabilities B and negatively on the public sector’s foreign assets 
A1, such that [ ] 1 / B A φ φ = .    
As the CB deals directly with monitoring and supervising financial intermediation, we 
presume that the CB has a comparative advantage in reducing the probability of a financial crisis 
triggered by sudden stops, implying that, for a given ratio of foreign borrowing to assets, the 
CB’s management results in a lower probability of sudden stops than would that of the SWF, i.e. 
[ ] [ ] cb sw x x φφ < , where  [ ] [ ] ; cb sw x x φφ denote the sudden stop probability if assets are managed by 
the CB and a Treasury-controlled SWF, respectively, and  1 / x BA = .
5   
The cost of delegating financial stability management to the CB is that, in case of need, 
only a fraction q of  sw A  would be available to the CB (0 1 q ≤ < ).  This may reflect both the 
lower liquidity of the SWF’s investment, and institutional frictions that may slow down the 
SWF’s ability to mobilize resources.  Hence, under CB management, 
[ ] () 1, 1, / cb cb cb sw xB A q A φφ ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ .   For simplicity, we assume that q = 0, implying 
[ ] 1, / cb cb cb xB A φφ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ .    
The diversification problem facing the CB is identical to the one described in section A1, 
i.e. maximize with respect to  cb F  the objective function 
{ } [ ] { } [ ] 1, 1, 1/ / ( 1 ) cb cb cb cb cb cb cb V E BA UC BA UC p φφ ⎡⎤ =− + − ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  
                                                 
5 One way to capture the CB’s comparative advantage is to suppose that   (1 ) ; 0 1 cb sw bb φ φ = −< < , where b 
measures the delegation gain associated with assigning the financial stability objective to the CB.   In these 
circumstances, delegation implies that the CB will choose a more prudent policy than the one chosen by the SWF.  
The financial stability delegation to the CB makes the Treasury and SWF better off if the efficiency gains associated 
with CB’s comparative advantage are sizable enough (i.e., for large enough b).     50
subject to (A1’),  where φ  is replaced with cb φ  and B and  cb A  are exogenous to the CB’s actions. 
Hence an analogue to the first order condition (A6) holds: 
2
1,











       ( A 6 ’ )  
The SWF’s expected utility is akin to (A2), modified by delegating the financial stability 
objective to the CB:   
$ [] { } $ [] { } 1, 1 1, 1 1; ; ( ) ( 1 ) cb cb sw cb sw cb sw V E ABUA Y B ABUA Y φ φτ ⎡⎤ =− + − + +− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦  (A2’) 
where $
cb φ  is the probability of a sudden stop as determined by CB policy, which in turn is  
conditional on the CB’s initial foreign asset holdings set by the Treasury  cb A  as well as 
(exogenous) foreign borrowing  B. 
6 
The Treasury’s problem is to determine, for given initial public assets A, the SWF’s 
investment in equities  sw F   and the optimal level of initial CB assets  cb A , that maximize (A2’), 
subject to  
  1, () ( ) ; 0 sw o cb sw sw sw sw sw A r A A e F FAA δ =−+ + ≤ ≤ ≤     ( A 7 )    
(Recall that setting  cb A also determines the SWF’s safe asset holdings  sw A , since  swc b AA A =− .) 
The first-order condition for optimal  sw F  and asset diversification by the SWF is    
$ { } $ { } 1, 1 1, 1 1' ' () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) () 0 cb cb sw sw sw sw EU A Y BU A Y e φφ τ τ δ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤⎡ ⎤ −+ − + + − − + = ⎣⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
 (A8) 
or   [ ] /0 sw sw Ed U d F = . Comparing (A8) to (A4), we infer that delegating financial stability 
policy to the CB implies that the SWF equates the expected marginal benefit of diversification, 
[/ ] sws w Ed U d F , to zero, instead of equating it to the expected cost of increasing the sudden stop 
probability.  
Figure A3 illustrates the effect of policy delegation on the  SWF’s degree of 
diversification. The bottom curve shows the SWF’s diversification pattern in the absence of 
delegation, corresponding to the case depicted in the left panel of A1 (with the same parameter 
values, including  a =20).  The top curve (labeled “SWF, CB delegation”) corresponds to the 
                                                 
6 (A6’) yields an expression for  cb F as an implicit function of cb A , as well as B ande δ + :     [] ;,, cb cb cb FF A B e δ σ = . 
Substituting  
cb F into φ  gives  1, / cb cb cb BA φφ = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦     ( ) 0 /[ ] ( ) cb cb cb cb Br A FA e φδ ⎡ ⎤ =+ +
⎣ ⎦
  $ [] ; cb cb A B φ ≡ .   51
SWF’s diversification pattern with the same asset base ( 1 sw A = ), in circumstances where the CB 
is assigned the objective of minimizing the probability of a sudden stop (for the case where 
1 cb A = , a = 10).  With delegation, for any given volatility of returns, the SWF chooses to hold a 
higher level of foreign equity assets, implying greater diversification. 
Our framework also implies that, as part of its optimal portfolio policy, the Treasury 
determines the CB’s initial foreign assets,  cb A .  The discussion above implies that, above a 
threshold of foreign assets A, marginal increases in A lead to greater asset allocation by the 
Treasury to the SWF.  This holds trivially as the probability of sudden stop, $
cb φ  , approaches  
zero.   
More generally, the first-order condition determining  cb A is: 
$ { } [] () $ { } () ( ) ()   ()
$
()
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[] $ { } [] $ { } ()   () 11 1 /1 ' ' ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( ) ' cb cb cb oc b Ed U d A E U A Y B U A Y r e F φφ τ τ δ ⎡⎤ ≡− + − + + −−+ + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
. 
Thus the Treasury extends more initial foreign assets to the central bank to the point that the 
expected marginal benefit of doing so, [ ] / cb Ed U d A  , i.e. the expected marginal utility valuation 
of the return associated with higher  cb A  --   
1, /( ) ' cb cb o cb dA dA r e F δ =++ , where     'cb F  is the 
marginal impact on the CB’s optimal foreign equity holdings
7 --  equals the marginal increase in 
the probability of a sudden stop, $'cb φ , times the utility cost of a sudden stop, 
[ ] [ ] 11 11 () ( 1 ) UA Y B U A Y τ +− − + − . 
                                                 
7 As noted earlier, (A6’) yields an expression for  cb F as an implicit function of  cb A , as well as B ande δ + :  
  [] ;,, cb cb cb FF A B e δ σ = .   52
 
A3. Domestic and External Transparency   
We conclude with a short discussion about the impact of transparency on the behavior of 
a SWF. We denote domestic and international transparency indices by  dom intl , tt , respectively.  
Domestic transparency determines the opaqueness of the SWF to domestic tax payers.  If greater 
domestic transparency increase the median voter’s support for the SWF, greater resources may 
be delegated to it, implying  [ ] dom ,' 0 AA t A => .
8     In less democratic countries, SWF 
management may reflect the preferences of a narrow power group, and the determination of 
internal transparency is more involved.  Too little transparency may backfire by fueling popular 
dissent, encouraging political instability, and possibly reducing the tenure of the Treasury 
management by its forceful removal from office.   Yet, “high” domestic transparency may entail 
another cost to the Treasury in the form of greater discontent, inducing other power groups to 
challenge the size and the mandate of the SWF.  In these circumstances, the association between 
the resources available to the Treasury and domestic transparency may have an inverted U-shape, 
[ ] dom ,' 0 , " 0 AA t A A => < .
9   
Similarly, international transparency refers to the degree to which the holdings and the 
investment strategy of the SWF is transparent to the global financial system.  The SWF may face 
a complex trade off regarding international transparency.  If the SWF benefits from access to 
superior talent and information, greater transparency may reduce the effectiveness of any 
proprietary strategy used by the fund.  Yet, inadequate international transparency tends to reduce 
the hospitality shown towards FDI and portfolio investment in the host country and possibly 
encourage local efforts to reduce SWF’s access to profitable business opportunities.  This 
                                                 
8 In a more general framework these levels of transparency may be determined endogenously. 
9 The Treasury’s solution may entail running “double accounting books,” where official figures may understate 
actual SWF accumulations and allocations.   One can model this behavior in a version of a principal-agent model, 
extending Hermalin and Weisbach (2007).  The Treasury, as the principal, manages the SWF, determining its 
transparency.  The agents consist of tax payers and other power groups.  Monitoring the principal entails a political 
struggle that is costly to both the principal (possibly through the loss of control), and agents (exposed to possible 
violence and punishment).  In these circumstances, if agents believe that the gap between the official and the actual 
books is not “large,” they will tolerate an equilibrium with limited domestic transparency.  The principal then 
determines the “optimal” level of domestic transparency” taking into account that low transparency allows it to gain 
by increasing the gap between the actual and official  books, balanced against the cost of increasing the probability 
of losing control.   53
suggests that the association between excess equity returns and the SWF’s international 
transparency may have an inverted U shape,  [ ] intl
'" ,0 , 0 sw sw sw sw ee t e e = <> .
10  
In our benchmark model, increases in domestic transparency can be interpreted as 
parametric shifts in A. As depicted in Figure 1b, in the case that greater transparency primarily 
increases the level of foreign assets allocated to the SWF, the level of investment in foreign 
equity assets raises significantly for any given volatility level δ .
11  Similarly, if the degree of 
international transparency increases enough to raise the expected return to foreign assets, the 
SWF’s foreign equity investment increases as well.  
                                                 
10 SWF size also may play an important role: limited transparency by larger funds may encourage greater hostility to 
investment in foreign markets, possibly owing to the fear that a large player may use its market clout strategically, 
such as for mercantilist trade goals. 
11 In our framework with responsibility for financial stability delegated to the central bank, the Treasury sets   cb A , 
given A, while the CB determines cb F , given  cb A . But setting  cb A also determines the SWF’s safe asset holdings sw A , 
since  swc b A AA =− . In this case sw A  depends on tdom only through A: an increase in domestic transparency that 
results in greater initial public foreign entrusted to the Treasury also is associated with greater assets entrusted to the 
sovereign wealth fund.  
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Figure A1. Equity return volatility, foreign equity holdings, and asset size 
  
                                         
 A   =   1        A   =   3  
Note: The bottom (top) curve corresponds to the CB behavior (SWF). Simulation assumes 
{ } 1 [/ ( ) ] ; 1
h MIN a B A B φ =+ , the equity shock, δ , takes on two values, either δ  or  δ − , and 
01 0, 2, 2, 1.6, 0.05, 0.2, 0.9, 12, 20 rY B e p h a β τ ==== = = = = = . The lefthand and  righthand panels assume 
initial asset size levels A of 1 and 3, respectively. 
  
Figure A2.  Equity return shock realizations and probability of sudden stop. 
   
Note: Simulation assumes 0.15; 0.87; 1 cb sw FFA == = , and the parameters specified in Figure A1. The bold curve 
draws the sudden stop probability for F = 0.87 (the SWF equity share for volatility level δ = 0.2), while the dotted 
curve draws the sudden stop probability for F = 0.15 (the CB equity share for volatility 0.2).    
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Note: Bottom curve describes SWF diversification in the absence of delegation. The simulation assumes 
{ } 1 [/ ( ) ] ; 1
h
sw MIN a B A B φ =+ , the equity shock, δ , takes two on values, either δ  or  δ − , and 
01 0, 2, 2, 1, 1.6, 0.05, 0.2, 0.9, 12, 20 SW rY A B e p h a β τ === = = = = = = = . The top curve describes  
SWF behavior with delegation, where  1, 1 sw cb AA = = , and  { } 1, 0.5 [ /( )] ;1
h
cb cb MIN a B A B φ =+  
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